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Responsibility and Law:
In Defense of the McNaghten Rules
by Jerome Hall • Professor of Law at Indiana University
* In the September, 1955, issue of the Journal, we carried an article by Solicitor
General Simon E. Sobeloff (now a Judge on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals)
proposing that the traditional legal test for insanity-the McNaghten rule-be
abolished on the ground that it is obsolete and unscientific. Professor Hall dis-
agrees sharply with Judge Sobeloff arguing that the "right and wrong" test, far
from being obsolete, is fundamental in our standards of morality.
* In his recent article in this
JOURNAL,' Judge Simon E. Sobeloff
reveals a humanitarian concern re-
garding the issue of insanity under
present rules and a commendable
desire to adopt reforms in accord-
ance with the progress of science. It
is evident, however, that the position
taken by the then Solicitor General
rests entirely upon the dubious
theories of certain psychiatrists who
have long been extremely hostile
critics of criminal responsibility.
The issues thus raised extend far be-
yond the boundaries of the criminal
law-important as those are. In fact,
they challenge the very foundation
of Anglo-American law.
The McNaghten Rules
A Restatement of Old Law
The core of the McNaghten rules is
that, "to establish a defence on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the com-
mitting of the act, the party accused
was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong."'2 What are
the criticisms of these rules which
the extremist psychiatrists, whose
theories are accepted by Judge Sobel-
off, have vigorously urged? First, the
rules are said to be the product of an
age of unsound, rationalistic psy-
chology. That psychiatry has con-
tributed much to the knowledge of
human nature during the past sev-
enty-five years may be readily grant-
ed. But the McNaghten rules, far
from being a creation of the nine-
teenth century legal mind, were a
restatement of very old law-the nov-
elty being merely the restriction of
the test to the particular conduct in
issue. The test of rationality ex-
pressed in the rules can be traced to
the thirteenth century legal treatise
by Bracton, and thence ultimately to
the ancient Greeks, especially to
Aristotle and Plato. When Judge
Sobeloff echoes a psychiatrist's ridi-
cule of an eighteenth century judge's
reference to a "wild beast test" he
blinks the fact that, in its historical
context, this was merely a metaphor
distinguishing normal human intel-
ligence from instinctive animal be-
havior.
The enduring elements in the
long tradition, which the McNagh-
ten rules preserve, may be briefly in-
dicated.3 The first wing of the rules,
that which concerns knowledge of
"the nature and quality of the act he
was doing", refers to normal func-
tions of perceiving and interpreting
ordinary phenomena as a test of nor-
mal competence. The emphasis is
factual-in his relation to the things
and persons about him, does the de-
fendant have the normal capacity to
understand their principal charac-
teristics and the consequences of or-
dinary actions? These rational func-
tions are also dealt with in psychiatry
in terms of the "ego" and the "reali-
ty principle", but few systematic
studies on the "cognitive functions
of the ego have as yet been pub-
lished .... '4
1. Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law:
From McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond, 41
A.B.A.J. 793 (1955).
2. McNaghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210,
8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
3. For a fuller discussion of the issues con-
cerning mental disease, together with docu-
mentation and citations supporting the fol-
lowing analysis, see the writer's GENERAL
PRINCIPLES Or CRIMINAL LAW, Chapter 14
(1947), and his articles, Psychiatry and the
Law, 38 IOWA L. REv. 687 (1953) and Psychia-
try and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.
JOUs. 761 (1956).
4. "Now conscious thought by means of
speech signs is the highest accomplishment of
the psychical apparatus, and alone makes ad-
justment to reality possible .. " Ferenczi,
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 195 (1916).
The quotation in the text is from Alexander,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 85 (1948).
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The second half of the McNagh-
ten rules, which concerns the capac-
ity to understand that "he was doing
what was wrong", is also of an-
cient origin. But throughout history,
from Socrates' opponents to the re-
cent Vienna positivists, sophisticates
have opposed the very possibility of
sound moral decision, stigmatizing
that and all relevant standards as
mere pretense, self-deception and
sheer "nonsense". It is possible here
only to note, as any reader may veri-
fy, that the attack of extremist psy-
chiatrists on the "right and wrong"
test reflects that philosphy.5 In
sharp contrast, the work of the most
profound thinkers through the ages
as well as common sense and the
legal order, especially of democratic
societies, make very much sense of
morality. They affirm and exemplify
the validity of thoughtful moral de-
cisions. In sum, what must be held
in view is that the McNaghten rules
specify normal rational functions
regarding certain conduct as a test
of serious mental disease-to be in-
sane is to be irrational.
Judge Sobeloff is persuaded that
this test of insanity is quite falla-
cious. He asserts, "This test, known
familiarly as the 'right and wrong
test', turns on a specified and very
limited symptom of insanity, which
science no longer deems necessarily
or even typically associated with
most serious mental disorders." 6
Elsewhere in his article the Judge
confidently asserts that "science",
"scientific facts" and "the latest
knowledge of human behavior" have
demonstrated the invalidity and ir-
relevance of the McNaghten rules.
Science and Psychiatry . . .
Psychology of American Law
Now, we are accustomed in this
country to accept and use science.
We have the most highly developed
technology the world has seen; in-
deed, the genius of American cul-
ture consists largely in a willingness,
perhaps zealousness, to make the
maximum use of science. Lawyers
and the legal order reflect these na-
tional traits. Patent lawyers and
many others draw daily upon phys-
ics and chemistry. Blood analysis,
the identification of fingerprints, bal-
listics and countless other scientific
facts are unhesitatingly relied upon
by the courts. It is a very serious mat-
ter, indeed, if in trials where life and
liberty are at stake, lawyers and
judges stupidly cling to unsound ar-
chaic notions when scientific knowl-
edge is available.
What then, are this "science",
these "scientific facts" and that "lat-
est knowledge of human behavior"
to which Judge Sobeloff has access?
His favorable comments on the opin-
ions of certain psychiatrists and his
hearty approval of the Durham de-
cision,7 which relied upon these and
other psychiatrists, reveal what he
referred to when he used those im-
pressive terms. Of what do the con-
tributions of these psychiatrists con-
sist, and how can they be correctly
appraised?
"Science" has definite meaning
when applied to such fields as physics
and chemistry. It designates certain
descriptive propositions or laws
(e.g., gases expand directly in pro-
portion to increase in temperature
and inversely as to increase in pres-
sure) which (1) generalize beyond
all the examined facts, (2) are veri-
fied by definite evidence, (3) express
a covariation of variables, e.g., as the
gas expands, the temperature rises,
and (4) are organized into a system
so that scientists can manipulate
them deductively. Psychiatry is cer-
tainly not "science" in this rigorous
sense. But, although the meaning of
the word need not concern us fur-
ther, it is important to know enough
about the status of psychiatric know-
ledge to assess pretentious claims
and, at the same time, avoid the
equal fallacy of dismissing all psy-
chiatry as fiction.
It may be hazarded that a defen-
sible hierarchy of the various branch-
es of knowledge on the basis of widely
accepted criteria would probably lo-
cate psychiatry far from rigorous sci-
ence and much closer to the kind of
knowledge found in art and history.
Moreover,- psychiatry is in a forma-
tive, uncertain period of develop-
ment and almost every conceivable
theory finds support in respectable
psychiatric circles. This is not de-
preciation of psychiatry by a lawyer.
For example, "The best psychiatry
is still more of art than of science",
wrote a distinguished psychiatrist.8
"There are, in fact, many methods,
standpoints, views and convictions
which are all at war with one an-
other", states Jung.9 "Psychopathol-
ogy is a speculative subject ...
There is much division of opinion
among psychopathologists on basic
principles."' 0 A competent practi-
tioner admits "the debatable charac-
ter of many theories", 1' while a
forthright investigator holds that
"no critically minded person prac-
ticed in scientific research or in dis-
ciplined speculation can accept psy-
choanalysis .... ,,12 And a psycholo-
gist, after a careful study, concludes:
"So many and so flagrant have been
the unscientific theorizing and prac-
tices of psychoanalysts during the
past 50 years that many critics of an-
alysis have become quite disillu-
sioned and have begun to see science
and analysis as antithetical ...
[O]rthodox analytic theory is itself
so formulated that a premium is of-
ten set on preconception and preju-
dice, while objectivity and open-
mindedness on the part of analytic
interpreters is made most difficult to
achieve and retain .... Analytic the-
ory has frequently managed to get so
far away from factual referents that
analysts easily fall into the habit of
evolving such clever, complex, and
almost fiendishly astute hypotheses
that they neglect entirely to look for
5. "When [a psychiatrist] is forced to adopt
the vocabulary of morality and ethics, he is
speaking in what to him is a foreign language.
" Sobeloff, op. cit. supra note 1 at 877.
Cf. Hall, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
526-535 (1947), and Hall, LIvINo LAW OF DEM-
OCRATIC SOCIETY, Chapter 2 (1949).
6. Sobeloff, op. cit. at 793 (italics added).
7. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
8. Sullivan, Psychiatry, 12 ENcYc. Soc. ScI.
580 (1934).
9. Jung, MODERN MAN IN SEARCH OF A SOUL.
33 (1939).
10. Coleman, Psychopathology, 9Q J. MEaT.
Sci. 152 (1944).
11. Horney, NEW WAYS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 8
(1939).
12. Murray, Psychology and the University,
34 ARCH. NEUROL. AND PSYCHIAT. 803, 809 (1935).
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objective data with which to support
them ... "13
Accordingly, even if lawyers were
wholly uninitiated into the psychol-
ogy of human beings, they could
hardly be expected to accept all the
findings of psychiatry, including the
theories which flatly contradict ev-
erything lawyers know or believe
about human nature. It happens,
however, that lawyers are highly
trained professional persons whose
function in society is precisely to
deal with human problems. This
profession, which has studied the
conduct of human beings in very
many situations and accumulated
this knowledge in countless records,
is now presumed to know so little
about commonplace facts of human
nature that it is asked to accept the
opinions of certain psychiatrists as
science, regardless of the conflicts
among these experts and the obvious
uncertainties in this developing
field.
It is hazardous to appraise the
competence of one's own profession;
and in any case it is preferable to re-
call the observation of one of our
most eminent psychologists that,
"dealing as it does mainly with hu-
man behavior, the law very likely has
more to teach psychology than to
learn from it".14 Another distin-
guished psychologist, after reviewing
the principal schools of psychology,
including psychiatry and his own
position, raised the pertinent ques-
tion, how are lawyers to choose
among them? And he gave some very
sound advice-the lawyer should not
try to choose among the experts. He
should "become his own competent
critic on matters of psychological
theory. There is no easy way. There
are no official guides to lead him
through the shifting controversies
and to pick out for him just those
elements of psychological theory
which he can adopt with safety
"15
The above criticism does not im-
ply that there is no valid knowledge
in psychiatry. Nor does it imply
that anyone-lawyer, psychiatrist or
layman-can espouse any conceiva-
ble psychological theory with as
much warrant as any other person
may claim for his view of psychology.
There is valuable knowledge in psy-
chiatry which, if carefully selected
with reference to what is important
in law and critically appraised,
can be extremely helpful. For exam-
ple, psychiatry has uncovered hid-
den recesses in the personality and,
even though therapy has lagged far
behind diagnosis, psychiatry can re-
veal much regarding motivation, dis-
guised drives, the actual meaning of
surface rationalizations and the emo-
tional conflicts which have influ-
enced the commission of serious
harms. Psychiatry can also throw
light on the origin and development
of abnormal personality; and it can
discover many facts which reveal to
jurors that a person who seems to be
normal, actually thinks, feels and
acts very abnormally. This knowl-
edge can be put to excellent use in
the administration of the law and in
the rehabilitation of offenders.
On the other hand, there is the
living psychology of the law, indi-
cated above, which has endured
through the ages, modified and deep-
ened by the progress of psychology,
but has retained basic insights re-
garding the principal characteristics
of normal and insane behavior. This
psychology should be improved in
the light of psychiatric and other
advances, but no reason or evidence
has been adduced to warrant its
abandonment, at least as regards
knowledge of ordinary mental func-
tions which concern individual re-
sponsibility. More specifically, in the
light of existing knowledge and ex-
perience, lawyers, judges and intelli-
gent laymen cannot be expected to
accept the notion that a rational
person may be insane. Yet, as will
shortly be shown, that is precisely
the objective of the extremist criti-
cism of the McNaghten rules.
Responsibility . • •
A Matter of Common Sense
If one considers the meaning of the
legal tests of rationality in relation
to criminal responsibility it becomes
clear that the assault on the Mc-
Naghten rules implies much more
News Bureau Indiana University
Professor Jerome Hall is the author of
"General Principles of Criminal Law"
(1947) and other books on criminal law
and jurisprudence. In 1954-1955, he
made an around-the-world lecture tour,
spending four months in the Far East
and nine months as Fulbright Lecturer
at the University of London Law School.
than the presumption that lawyers
are amateurs in the field of human
psychology. Ultimately, it is an at-
tack on experience and common
sense. It assumes that even the most
thoughtful layman's experience with
his fellow men and his sensitive in-
sight into the functioning of his own
personality in elementary acts for
which persons are held responsible,
are wholly fallacious.
It is not easy to define "responsi-
bility" in a few words, but its import
and role in daily life are recognized
by everyone except those who as-
sume special, sometimes necessary,
perspectives. We speak of a lawyer's
responsibility to his clients, a father's
responsibility for the welfare and
education of his children, the respon-
sibility to perform one's contracts
and other promises, the responsi-
bility of this generation to suc-
ceeding ones as regards the conser-
(Continued on page 984)
13. Ellis, An Introduction to the Principles
of Scientific Psychoanalysis, 41 GENETIC PSY-
CHOL. MONOGRAPHS 155, 157, 160, 195 (Murchi-
son ed. 1950).
14. Thorndike, MAN AND His WoRXS 133
(1943).
15. Robinson,. LAW AND THE LAWYZEs 111
(1935).
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vation of resources and the freedom
of future Americans. There is also-
need it be added?-the responsibility
for murder, rape, robbery and breach
of the other simple duties enjoined
in criminal law, which any normal
youth or adult can easily understand.
The soldier and the policeman on
guard in the night as well as daily
experience in countless other situa-
tions also indicate the central mean-
ing of responsibility and its vital
functions in our society. What is this
meaning and what have rational
mental functions, as stated, e.g., in
the McNaghten rules, to do with
responsiblity?
To be responsible means (I) to
be able to recognize and discharge
various duties and (2) to be morally
censurable for the voluntary breach
of those duties and legally liable if
their violation is forbidden by law.
The criminal law is concerned with
the voluntary commission of legally
forbidden harms, i.e., with .conduct
in which intelligence participates. It
is therefore concerned to determine
whether persons who commit such
harms are normal or psychotic, that
is, whether they are responsible in
the sense of being competent to un-
derstand the simple moral duties en-
joined by criminal law in the way
normal persons understand them.16
The McNagh ten rules provide tested
criteria of normal competence-and
thus of responsibility.
Only when responsibility is held in
view, with its implications of moral
obligation and the significant, if lim-
ited, capacity of free choice by nor-
mal persons, can the meaning and
grounds of punishment be grasped.
In this context it makes sense to hold
that a normal offender should be
punished-e.g., because he voluntar-
ily killed a human being. The volun-
tary commission of a harm is met by
an appropriate social response
whose meaning necessarily differs
from that of rewards for service well
done. The punishment of a volun-
tary harmdoer is thus a rational ex-
pression of the community's values.
If the ethics of responsibility had no
place in this, there would be nothing
to mitigate the imposition of any
punishment, however severe, that
would actually deter convicted and
potential offenders regardless of their
mental condition.
One does not recognize the full
impact of Judge Sobeloff's position
upon the psychology and ethics of
responsibility until he realizes that it
represents not only the rejection of
irrationality as an essential element
of insanity but also acceptance of the
"irresistible impulse" theory as well
as the abandonment of the rule of
law in the determination of insanity.
In order to understand what is in-
volved in these important issues, it is
essential to keep in mind that the
"irresistible impulse" test is a com-
plete alternative to the McNaghten
rules. It must not be confused with
the inability to control conduct
which co-exists with and results from
disordered intelligence-that is quite
within the McNaghten rules. Under
the "irresistible impulse" test it is
necessary to instruct a jury that even
though the defendant knew the na-
ture and consequences of his conduct
and also knew that it was morally
wrong, nonetheless he must be ac-
quitted if his volition was so diseased
that he was "irresistibly impelled"
to commit the harm in issue. 17
The "irresistible impulse" test has
been rejected in England and a very
large majority of American states, but
it is accepted in about ten states'8
and by some federal courts. It is
sometimes asserted that there have
been no ill effects in the states which
16. The Judge's assertion that "Only the
drooling idiot can be said to have no knowl-
edge of right and wrong .... " (op. cit. page
793) is a wholly incorrect interpretation of
the McNaghten rules. The rules require such
a serious, substantial departure from the nor-
mal as to constitute insanity. The standard of
"normality", though admittedly vague at the
periphery, is employed in law, psychiatry and
many other fields as an essential notion. Cf. 2
Stephen, HisTosy OF THE CRIMINAL LAW or
ENGLAxD 163 (1883).
17. Judge Sobeloff refers to Parsons v. State,
81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887) as "one of the
most rewarding pieces of literature .... " Op.
cit. supra note 1 at 794. Judge Somerville,
who wrote that opinion, held that there may
be "insane persons, of a diseased brain, who,
while capable of perceiving the difference be-
tween right and wrong, are, as matter of fact,
so far under the duress of such disease as to
destroy the power to choose between right
and wrong" (859). Judge Sobeloff's view is al-
so shown in his complete endorsement of the
Durham decision, where it was said, " . . . in
1929, we . . . added the irresistible impulse
test .... " 214 F. 2d 872-873.
recognize the test but, in fact, no
study of the operation of the test has
been made. Nor is it known to what
extent judges and jurors nullify the
test or limit its significance by intro-
ducing common sense notions of hu-
man behavior and the substance of
the McNaghten rules. What can be
said about the "irresistible impulse"
test which is beyond controversy is.
that it originated a century or more
ago in a very rudimentary psycholo-
gy which included speculative no-
tions of "moral insanity" and such
curiosities as the belief that an un-
seen ligament might be pressing on
the mind. This confirms Dr. Frederic
Wertham's statement that "... the
conception of irresistible impulse ...
is a throwback to, or rather a sur-
vival of, the previous 'philosophical
psychological' era. . . . It forms no
part of and finds no support in
the modern dynamic psychoanalytic
study of mental processes."' 9
Since the 1953 Report of the Roy-
al Commission, many, perhaps most,
psychiatrists who formerly accepted
the formula, "irresistible impulse"
test, have decided that those words
are improperly restrictive because,
as Judge Soboloff states it, instead of
impulsive action, there may be "long
and sustained brooding". These psy-
chiatrists now prefer to speak in
terms of being "incapable of prevent-
ing himself from committing" the
act.2 0 But this does not in the least
imply any abandonment of the "ir-
resistible impulse" test or theory. On
the contrary, an examination of the
Attention should, however, be directed to
the questionable basis of the assumption of
the Durham decision that Smith v. United
States, 36 F. 2d 548 (1929), adopted the "irre-
sistible impulse" test. In that case, the court,
referring to "uncontrollable impulse", said,
"This impulse must be such as to override the
reason and judgment and obliterate the sense
of right and wrong to the extent that the
accused is deprived of the power to choose
between right and wrong." (549, italics add-
ed). This sentence makes it doubtful whether
the decision did adopt the "irresistible im-
pulse" test.
18. In some of these states, there are very
few recent decisions and the facts reported
in these are scant. It cannot be said that there
is a substantial, well-considered body of law
which supports the "irresistible impulse" test.
19. Wertham, The Psychiatry of Criminal
Guilt, in SOCIAL MEANING OF LEOAL CoxcEr s-
CRIMINAL GUsLT 164 (N.Y.U. School of Law,
1950).
20. Report of the Royal Comm. on Capital
Punishment 113, 287 (1953). discussed in 65
YALE L. Jout. 776-778 (1956).
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Report of the Royal Commission
and of relevant cases reveals that
dropping the term "impulse" is
either a merely verbal change, or
that the new formula is so vague as
to amount to no rule at all. 21 What
the new formula actually signifies is
that the psychiatrists who take that
stand insist on the unlimited appli-
cation and validity of "irresistible
impulse". They take a bolder sweep-
ing position to the effect that many
persons whom they classify as psy-
chotic have normal intelligence.
That the Durham decision also went
farther and deeper in the direction
of the "irresistible impulse" theory
is clear from its complete acceptance
of the majority's recommendations
in the Report of the Royal Commis-
sion.22 This position has been ag-
gressively publicized in this country.
Hence, it is not surprising that a
number of busy lawyers and judges,
and even some scholars, seeking to
improve the law, should readily find
books and articles which support
that theory. It is little wonder that
such a lawyer might conclude that
science "no longer deems [the right
and wrong test] necessarily or even
typically associated with most serious
mental disorders."
But it is also true and much more
important that psychiatrists are
sharply divided on this question and
that some of the most distinguished
of them vigorously oppose the "irre-
sistible impulse" theory. Among
them are Norwood East, for many
years the leader of British forensic
psychiatry and, in this country, Doc-
tors Frederic Wertham, H. A. David-
son, and others. 23 It is recognized
that there are compulsive actions,
but they are harmless ones, e.g., like
counting windows or excessive hand-
washing. Modern psychiatry, these
Lost Evidence
Much evidence is often lost when a
transcript is made containing reference
to a blackboard sketch which no longer
exists.
With the Oravisual Easel you need not
wipe out valuable evidence or informa-
tion presented at a court trial. Just turn
the page of your large writing pad to a
new clean sheet. You retain the used
sheets for further reference.
VISUAL AIDS in court, trials can help
you:
1. Focus and hold attention
2. List facts and statistical data which
people can grasp at a glance and then
retain as vivid mental impressions
3. Clarify, emphasize and speed under-
standing
ORAVISUAL EASELS are available in a variety of sizes and styles. All
are made of light weight and durable aluminum. Some are portable for
easy carrying, while others (equipped with casters and magnetic chalk-boards) are designed principally for one-location use.
Write for free 16 page illustrated catalog.
General Office & FactoryORAVISUAL CO., INC. Box 609A, St. Petersburg 2, Fla.
forensic psychiatrists inform us, does
not support the notion that persons
with normal intelligence may be ir-
resistibly impelled to kill or rob. So,
too, kleptomania, pyromania and so
on provide wide variations and com-
plexities which may include serious
disorders that become operative at
the time of the conduct in issue or
they may be merely neurotic actions
which should not exempt these of-
fenders from criminal liability, even
though mitigation in punishment is
warranted.24
The "irresistible impulse" theory
also conflicts with theories which
all psychiatrists accept, e.g., the in-
tegration of the functions of the
personality. Judge Sobeloff states,
"... responsibility implies reasonable
integration of the total personality
which includes the emotions as well
as the intellect. Medical psychology
teaches that the mind cannot be split
into watertight, unrelated, autono-
mously functioning compartments
like knowing, willing and feeling."25
That view of personality has not
only been very widely approved by
psychiatrists, it is also verified in
common experience. For example, a
normal person who sees a man cruel-
ly beating a child does not coldly
recognize the immorality of that con-
duct; instead, his intellectual judg-
ment is permeated with feeling, and
tendencies to take appropriate ac-
tion are also involved. If disintegra-
tion or "dissociation" occurs, the
intelligence is no longer normal. Ac-
cordingly, when lip service is paid to
common principles of right and
wrong by psychotic persons, that
provides no support of assertions
that they understand moral obliga-
tions in the way normal persons un-
derstand them.
This leads to a crucial question-
if the normal personality operates
as a unit, as a coalescence of the var-
ious functions, how is it possible
that an essential phase of it, i.e., vo-
lition, can be very seriously diseased
while, at the same time, intelligence
remains normal? The writer has
raised this question many times
without receiving an adequate re-
ply.26
In addition to the fact that some
of the most distinguished forensic
psychiatrists oppose the "irresistible
impulse" theory, and apart from the
incompatibility of the theory with
that of the integration of normal
21. See 65 YALE L. JouR., 778-779.
22. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 873
(1954).
23. For references to the publications of
these psychiatrists, consult the citations given
in footnote 3 supra; also footnote 24.
24. See Davidson, Irresistible Impulse and
Criminal Responsibility, 1 J. FoRENsIc Sci-
ENCEs 1 (No. 2, April 1956).
25. Op. cit. 794.
26. See 65 YALE L. Jout., 775-776.
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personality, there is an even more
important reason for rejecting the
"irresistible impulse" theory, name-
ly, that theory is diametrically op-
posed to the psychology and the
ethics of Anglo-American law. It is
opposed to the psychology of that
law because it contradicts the view
that normal intelligence plays an es-
sential part in controlling conduct,
especially the voluntary conduct
which criminal law penalizes. The
deterministic premise of the "irre-
sistible impulse" theory also contra-
dicts the ethics of Anglo-American
law, expressed in terms of respon-
sibility for voluntary conduct by per-
sons who are able to make relatively
free moral decisions. Indeed, it con-
tradicts the goal which psychiatric
therapy itself aims at when it brings
hidden facts into the open so that
the patient is brought to understand
his situation and thus to conduct
himself as a normal person.
Accordingly, one is led to ask-if
normal intelligence, with its affec-
tive support, does not participate in
the control of voluntary conduct,
what can and does control the behav-
ior of human beings? If the pilot is
unseated, who or what guides the
ship? Let us see how Judge Sobeloff
deals with this problem.
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The Judge not only accepts the en-
larged version of the "irresistible im-
pulse" theory which the Durham
decision adopted; like that opinion,
he also insists that even that is not
enough to satisfy "science" and the
"latest knowledge of human behav-
ior". He advocates adoption of the
"historic" New Hampshire decision
of 1869, which was not recognized
by any other jurisdiction until 1954
when the District of Columbia, in
the Durham case27 chose it. "We do
not insist on a legal formula in
diagnosing other diseases; why in
this instance? It is a question of
fact like any other, to be de-
cided after hearing the explana-
tions of the experts." 28  If the
issue concerns the fracture of a bone
or whether someone had typhoid, he
continues, it would be absurd to spe-
cify the symptoms of fractures or
typhoid in a legal rule. Insanity is a
disease. Is it not absurd to specify its
symptoms in a rule of law? And the
Judge concludes his appeal for no
law by a curious reliance upon a very
questionable jurisprudence. For ex-
ample, he asserts, without documen-
tation, that "Judges and lawyers
boast that there is no definition of
fraud .... Its very vagueness is said
to be a source of strength.
"What could be fuzzier" than "the
so-called definition of negligence"?
The "reasonable man" is but "a chi-
merical creature" and such standards
as "due process", "unfair competi-
tion", "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" "are all as capable of ex-
pansion and contraction as the
subjective judgment of those who
interpret them."29 Hence, he con-
cludes, the sound thing is not to de-
fine insanity in any rule of law. That
is the Durham holding.
It is submitted, with deference,
that the above argument contains
some very serious fallacies. Almost
every legal system in the world speci-
fies essential elements of insanity in
legal rules and does not do that with
reference to other diseases. One rea-
son for this practically universal stip-
ulation of essential criteria of insan-
ity is that, life and liberty depend
upon the determination of the exist-
ence of this disease. The separation
of normal criminals from irrespon-
sible sick persons goes to the root of
even primitive legal systems.3 0 No
such ultimate value is involved in the
legal determination of fractures or
typhoid.
Second, Judge Sobeloff's distrust
of legal rules to aid "the enlightened
understanding of the special facts of
each case" suggests a preference for
unfettered power rather than the
sovereignty of law. This impression
is strengthened by his skeptical criti-
cism of "due process" and other
standards, noted above, despite the
fact that numerous cases specify and
limit their meaning, and by his dis-
regard of the feasibility of more spe-
cific definition in other areas. His
opinion is also to be sharply con-
trasted with that of Justice Devlin,
a leading English jurist, who em-
phatically rejected that same pro-
posal to abandon the McNaghten
rules, when it was recommended in
Britain by a Royal Commission in
27. Cf. State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 339, 270
P. 2d 727, 737 (1954): "It impresses me that
... they have for all practical purposes em-
braced the doctrine of 'irresistable [sic] im-
pulse' as a defense in criminal cases" (dis-
senting opinion).
28. Op. cit. 795.
29. Op. cit. 796.
30. 1 Westermarck, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS 269-276 (1912).
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1953Y31 It is not necessary to insist
here that whatever position a psychi-
atrist or criminologist urged, a law-
yer might be expected to place a
heavy burden of proof upon those
who would abandon the rule of law,
especially in the field of criminal lia-
bility.
Third, a rule of law specifying the
essential elements of insanity is not
only important and desirable for the
above reasons. It is also warranted on
factual grounds because intelligent
laymen, rather than psychiatrists, are
the best judges of what is normal
and what is abnormal conduct, and
the legal tests reflect the layman's ex-
perience. That is not true of bone
fractures or typhoid which are mar-
ginal and brief. But normal mental
functioning is daily functioning; and
serious mental disease-with the aid,
sometimes, of the expert's description
of the defendant's actual personality
-can be recognized in the light of,
and by contrast with, daily normal
functioning. One should not here
confuse identification of the fact of
insanity with the psychiatrist's spe-
cial methods of discovering it or his
expert knowledge of the origin and
therapy of it. Nor should one be mis-
led by the vehement criticism of the
legal tests by clinical psychiatrists
who have rarely studied psychoses in
social contexts which are important
in law. The functions of law include
the social assessment of responsibility
for certain conduct, and there is no
scientific or other reason which in-
validates the definition of serious
mental disease ("psychosis") from
that point of view. On the contrary,
there are many good reasons to do
that.
It is significant in this regard that
even the most vehement critics of
criminal responsibility do not advo-
cate that the fact-finding of mental
disease should be taken from the
jury and assigned to experts. But if
insanity is so elusive in its essential
characteristics that it cannot be rec-
ognized by intelligent laymen even
after the experts have described it
in detail, as manifested in the per-
sonality of the defendant, the logical
conclusions are to permit only psy-
chiatrists to decide this question and
merely inform the court and the
community of their disposition of
the accused persons. If intelligent
lay jurors can do a better job of the
necessary fact-finding than the ex-
perts, 2 that same lay experience,
refined by legal and medical opinion,
can stipulate essential criteria of in-
sanity in legal rules.
When the method and guidance of
long established rules of law are
abandoned, very serious problems
arise. The Durham holding "is sim-
ply that an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or
mental defect." And the court added,
"We use 'disease' in the sense of a
condition which is considered capa-
ble of either improving or deterio-
rating."33 On the premise that the
McNaghten test is not "even typi-
cally associated with most serious
mental disorders" and in the absence
of any other legal test, how is a
judge or jury to determine whether
a given act was "the product of men-
tal disease"? In Anglo-American law,
criminal liability is imposed for the
intentional or reckless commission
of forbidden harms. In other words,
a criminal harm is produced by a de-
fendant if he voluntarily committed
it; and voluntary conduct is "the ac-
tive aspect of intelligence".8 4 Under
the Durham holding, with its accept-
ance of the enlarged version of "ir-
31. "If a general question is to be left to
them, why restrict it to sanity or insanity?
Why not ask them in a general way whether
the accused was responsible at all? Under our
system the prosecution must allege and prove
a definite crime. No one would suggest that
the jury should be left with a general ques-
tion whether the law has been broken or
whether the prisoner should be punished or
not. I believe that a general question on in-
sanity would be just as objectionable. I
think there is great force in the observation
of the minority of the Commission on this
point at p. 286 where they say: 'It is the
traditional duty of our criminal law to lay
down by definition, as clearly as possible, the
essential elements of liability to conviction
and punishment.'" Devlin, Criminal Respon-
sibility and Punishment: Functions of Judge
and Jury, 1 Canm. L. REv. 683 (1954).
32. This is discussed in 65 YALE L. Jour.
resistible impulse",3 5 it is quite
possible, 36 indeed there will be en-
couragement, to admit the normality
of the defendant's intelligence and
nonetheless to defend on the ground
of a mental "disease". In reaching
its verdict, the jury is to exclude the
normal intelligence of a defendant
from its consideration, determine
whether the defendant had a mental
"disease" (as defined above by the
court?) and, finally, decide whether
tie harm he committed was "the
product" (in what sense?) of that
"disease". But if that is the process
of fact-finding, what is there, except
blind faith in experts (which ones?),
to support a finding that there is a
causal connection between the act
and the "disease"? And, especially
when there is a sharp conflict among
the experts, on what grounds and in
the light of what knowledge will a
judge or any other person be able to
appraise the validity of any verdict?
The Durham opinion asserts that
"The jury's range of inquiry will not
be limited to, but may include . . .
whether an accused . . . did not
know the difference between right
and wrong... the jury [will] per-
form its traditional function . .. to
apply 'our inherited ideas of moral
responsibility to individuals prose-
cuted for crime . . .' Juries will con-
tinue to make moral judgments...."
Judge Sobeloff also uses reassuring
language: "The right-wrong test is
769-771.
33. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 874-
875 (1954).
34. Wyatt, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE
AND WILL 153 (1930).
35. See Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d
873-874. See, too, the dissenting opinion, quot-
ed in note 27 supra and Justice Devlin's like
interpretation, quoted 65 YALE L. JouR. 778,
note 63.
36. "The district court further erred in its
charge in requiring the defendant to adduce
proof both that he did not know the differ-
ence between right and wrong and that he
was unable to refrain from doing wrong.
Either condition existing at the time of the
commission of the act and as the result of
some mental defect or disease was sufficient to
make the defendant not guilty." Howard v.
United States, 232 F. 2d 276 (1956) (court's
italics).
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not completely abandoned; it is
merely dethroned from its exclusive
preeminence." 37 In appraising these
assertions, the reader will recall the
statement that the McNaghten rules
are no longer "even typically asso-
ciated with most serious mental dis-
orders", the "irresistible impulse"
theory in its approved unlimited
version, the Judge's reference to the
New Hampshire decision, which
represents his proposed reform, as
"sweeping aside the McNaghten
rule",38  other similar statements,
and his acceptance of the "scientific"
psychiatrist's self-imposed limita-
tions on his testimony, shown, e.g.,
in the exclusion of "morality and
ethics . ..what to him is a foreign
language ..... ,89 The reader may
then decide for himself whether the
above assurances are worth some-
thing or whether they are merely
verbal, wholly unwarranted conclu-
sions from premises which point in
the very opposite direction.
With reference to the insistence
that the present rules exclude im-
portant evidence of insanity, it
should be noted, first, that not the
slightest proof has been adduced to
support that claim; on the contrary,
it is admitted even by opponents of
the rules that the courts interpret
them very liberally. Second, in view
of the fact that the control of volun-
tary conduct depends upon normal
intelligence, there is no reason under
the McNaghten rules to exclude evi-
dence of impulsive or other irra-
tional behavior. Third, while the
view that a normal personality func-
tions as a unit implies that evidence
of disordered volition as well as of
disordered intelligence should be ad-
mitted, it is inconsistent to advocate
the inclusive admission of evidence
regarding all the principal phases of
personality and, at the same time,
accept the "irresistible impulse"
theory in any of its formulations.
If the purpose of the Durham de-
cision was to admit all evidence and
all theories of insanity, it should not
have approved the "irresistible im-
pulse" test. It should have adopted,
instead, a neutral position-that
some psychiatrists hold thus and so
while others are opposed and hold
this and that; hence, admit every-
thing and leave the entire question
to the jury without any authorized
instruction. That, however, while
avoiding the confusion of the Dur-
ham decision, would represent not
only the abandonment of law but
also a confession of complete ignor-
ance and the utter repudiation of
the knowledge and experience of
lawyers, judges and intelligent lay-
men as well as of the position of dis-
tinguished forensic psychiatrists
whose work is compatible with legal
values and methods. Actually, as
Professor Robinson pointed out,
there is no defensible escape from
the task of deciding what is sound
psychiatry with reference to legal
problems and objectives.
Beyond Durham . .
A Tyranny of Experts?
The title of Judge Sobeloff's article
includes the words "From McNagh-
ten to Durham, and Beyond", which
suggests that other changes in that
direction are to follow. In terms of
the Western tradition, the alterna-
tive to and aftermath of the aban-
donment of law is tyranny; and the
history of criminal law in recent and
current dictatorships, with their typ-
ical espousal of "science", does not
encourage the concentration of pow-
er over life and liberty in the hands
of psychiatrists.40 The Judge's dis-
cussion of what lies beyond Durham
reveals a strong preference for re-
habilitation and serious doubts re-
garding punishment. Presumably,
most thoughtful persons prefer cor-
rective methods over merely puni-
Live ones. But such a general dis-
position or preference does not aid
solution of the specific complex
problems arising from the various
objectives of criminal law. Besides,
everything depends on the primary
questions, who is to decide whether
the accused is normal or psychotic
and by what methods shall that be
determined? Intelligent fact-finding,
guided and limited by the rule of
law and the advice of experts, not
the unfettered power of the latter, is
the tried, humanitarian method of
securing the best results.
If no rule of law specifies essential
criteria of insanity, the door is
thrown wide open to serious abuse.
There may be nothing then to re-
strain an expert, e.g., where commu-
nity feeling is aroused or a powerful
complainant is interested, from testi-
fying, or to keep a jury from being
led to believe, that a definitely psy-
chotic defendant is sane.41 Nor is it
a disservice to the many conscien-
tious psychiatrists who testify in
court to recall Professor Edmund
Morgan's observation that "In liti-
gation involving . . . alleged mental
irresponsibility and the like, the
medical expert has become a stench
in the nostrils of upright judges
.. "42 If, more often, the abandon-
ment of legal tests would facilitate
the acquittal of normal serious of-
fenders, that would undermine the
legal order, which cannot retain the
influence necessary to protect the
innocent if it is impotent to cope
with major, normal criminals. And
37. Op. cit. 796.
38. Op. cit. 794.
39. Op. cit. 877.
40. See Dr. Wertham's article, Psychoau-
thoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. Cm. L. Rv.
336 (1955).
41. See Note, 30 IND. L.J. 194, 204 note 59
(1955).
42. Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obatrse-
tione to Expert Testimony by Rules of Xvi-
dence, 10 U. Cu. L. RzV. 292-293 (1943).
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it is safe to predict that the abandon-
ment of legal tests in other areas
would encourage attempts to acquire
the property of alleged "incompe,
tents" through the nefarious use of
psychiatric testimony.
43
Accordingly, although the writer
endorses judge Sobeloff's suggestion
that "Means must be found to bring
the legal and medical professions to-
gether on common ground", it is
clear that some of the proposed
means cannot lead to that goal. Cer-
tainly, there is no reason why, when
a lawyer turns to a field like psychi-
atry, he should abandon his knowl-
edge and critical faculties and as-
sume that everything there is science.
Nor is it necessary to jettison the
rule and method of law in order to
make use of psychiatry. There are
areas of psychiatry which can imme-
diately be made the basis of fruitful
co-operation among the professions,
e.g., the theory of the integration of
normal personality, which supports
a wide definition of the term "know"
in the McNaghten rules. A leading
psychiatrist has appraised this ave-
nue to co-operation as "impressive"
and "helpful", emphasizing that
The 1956 Ross Essay
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statute, among other things, afforded
no protection against the use of
compelled testimony to search out
other evidence to be used against
the witness. And more recently, this
concept of testimony once removed
was given specific recognition by a
district court in a case not involving
an immunity statute. 31 Finally, in
a dissenting opinion in the Emspak
case Justice Harlan recognized the
concept of an incriminating answer
as follows:
The concept of an incriminating
"When no longer dismembered and
falsified in one-dimensional aspect,
but considered in all that we some-
times imply by 'appreciation,' 'reali-
zation,' 'normal evaluation,' 'ade-
quate feeling,' 'significant and ap-
propriate experiencing,' etc., the
term 'knowing' does not restrict us
solely to a discussion of the patient's
reasoning abilities in the abstract." 44
Accordingly, although the courts ac-
tually interpret "know" widely, a
revision of the McNaghten rules
which included references to con-
duct and used the terms "under-
stand" and "realize", would retain
the test of rationality and also pro-
vide more appropriate terms from
a psychological viewpoint.45 This
might also lead to a critical re-
examination of the "irresistible im-
pulse" test in the states which now
permit it, and to a consequent revi-
sion of the law. It should not be as-
sumed that the co-operation of the
legal profession with psychiatrists
precludes such reforms. Indeed, the
best evidence that the two profes-
sions were co-operating would be
joint efforts to improve the law in
the states and districts which now
answer includes not only those an-
swers which constitute an admission of
guilt, but also those which may fur-
nish evidence of guilt or merely sup-
ply a lead to obtaining such evidence.
Counselman v. Hitchcock 142 U.S. 547
(1892) .32
Following the concept of a link
in a chain to its logical conclusion,
the answer to the most innocuous
question could conceivably tend to
incriminate. However, the Supreme
Court in Hoffman v. United States33
gives us this test:
To sustain the privilege, it need
only be evident from the implications
of the question, in the setting in which
it is asked, that a responsive answer to
apply the "irresistible impulse" test.
There are other avenues to co-opera-
tion which would preserve the dis-
tinctive functions of law and at the
same time make use of the progress
of psychiatry and other empirical
knowledge.
In such efforts, it must never be
forgotten that very important values
are involved, especially that it is the
function of the legal order to main-
tain and encourage-not to under-
mine-personal responsibility. The
responsibility of lawyers is to support
and improve the law not to aban-
don it and allow power to be con-
centrated in the hands of experts.
43. See Smith, Cross-Examination of Neu-
ropsychiatric Testimony in Personal Injury
Cases, 4 VAND. L. REv. 15 (1950).
44. Cleckley, MASK OF SANITY 497 (2d ed.
1950); Hall, Psychiatry and the Law, 38 IowA
L. REV. 696 (1953).
45. E.g. "A crime is not committed by any-
one who, because of a mental disease, is
unable to understand what he is doing and to
control his conduct at the time he commits a
harm forbidden by criminal law. In deciding
this question with reference to the criminal
conduct with which a defendant is charged,
the trier of the facts should decide (1) wheth-
er, because of mental disease, the defendant
lacked the capacity to understand the physical
nature and consequences of his conduct; and
(2) whether, because of such disease, the de-
fendant lacked the capacity to realize that It
was morally wrong to commit the harm in
question." This is discussed in 65 YALE L.
JouR. 781-782.
the question or an explanation of why
it cannot be answered might be dan-
gerous because injurious disclosure
could result. The trial judge in ap-
praising the claim "must be governed
as much by his personal perception of
the peculiarities of the case as by the
facts actually in evidence". See Taft,
J., in Ex parte Irvine, 74 F. 954, 960
(C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1896) .34
The setting or circumstances in
which a particular question is asked
seems to be of utmost importance
when a question innocent on its face
31. United States v. Raley, 96 F. Supp. 495
(D. Ct., D.C. 1951).
32. 349 U.S. 190, 204, 205 (1955).
33. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
34. 341 U.S. 479, 486, 487 (1951).
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